Given the state of the evidence in the case, we cannot say that this evidence was of such character that it improperly tainted the jury's consideration of appellant's conduct that night. One door was in the living room and the other one in the kitchen. On original submission, we reversed the trial court's judgment of conviction and remanded the case for a new trial. Appellant failed to do so here and thus failed to meet his burden. Under Rule 701 of the Texas Rules of Evidence, a lay witness may testify to "opinions or inferences which are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding of the witness'[s] testimony or the determination of a fact in issue." The State avers only eighty-two days were on the clock. ¶ 44. Duplantis v. State, 644 So.2d 1235 (Miss.1994). Because Brewer failed to object to the allegedly improper prosecutorial comment and because the comment was a response to the previous argument of defense counsel, we conclude this assignment of error is without merit. 1. He told them he dropped it in a ditch while trying to run away from Harris. In four points of error—six, eleven, fourteen, and twenty-one—appellant asserts that the trial court erred in denying his motion for new trial. The record bears out the lower court's findings. In cases involving § 99-17-1 where the facts reflect that the accused's trial did not commence within 270 days of arraignment, the State bears the burden of establishing that there was good cause for the delay. Davis v. State, 684 So.2d 643 (Miss.1996). 2005); Swearingen v. State, 270 S.W.3d 804, 808 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 31, 2011) (mem. Citation. At the hearing on the motion for DNA testing, the reporter's record from Brewer's capital murder trial was introduced into evidence. CODE ANN., SECTION 99-19-105(7) (1972) AND M.R.A.P. After arriving at the scene, Officer Ridge spoke with all the parties involved in the collision and collected insurance information. ¶ 49. Brewer argues the trial court erred in denying his request for DNA testing, which was filed pursuant to article 64.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Osbourn v. State, 92 S.W.3d 531, 535 (Tex. At trial, appellant submitted written jury charge requests.

Crim. 58, 62 L.Ed.2d 38, (1979) (holding that the defendant, by means of various motions, raised issues which “precluded” the case coming to trial)). This Court concludes that these reasons are also sufficiently race-neutral.

2d 106 (Miss.1998). Under Strickland, there is a strong presumption that counsel's performance falls within the range of reasonable professional assistance. Get 2 points on providing a valid reason for the above

However, he had no basis-beyond his own suspicions-to conclude that a crime had been committed or that Brewer was the perpetrator. Brewer replied, “It need to been you dat [I] kilt.” 3. denied, 444 U.S. 830, 100 S.Ct.

As Brewer was sixteen years' old on the date of the offense, he was not subject to the death penalty. (mem. Same-transaction contextual evidence has been defined as evidence of other offenses connected with the offense charged; evidence which imparts information essential to understanding the context and circumstances of events which, although legally separate offenses, are blended or interwoven. Additionally, the curve or arch of the wound patterns on the child's body are identical to Brewer's upper teeth arch as illustrated in any number of the photographs. Brewer v. State, 650 P.2d 54 , 59-60 (Okl.Cr.1982). v. Id.

The record further indicates that on May 27, 1994, defense counsel informally requested a continuance due to the unexpected death of his expert. Brewer v. State, 725 So. On May 9 West returned to the morgue to compare the above-named individuals' dental models to the bite mark patterns on the child's body. Brewer was transferred to ISCI on May 18, 1991. Crim. art. ref'd); see State v. Guerrero, 400 S.W.3d 576, 585 n.30 (Tex. CONVICTION OF CAPITAL MURDER WHILE ENGAGED IN THE COMMISSION OF SEXUAL BATTERY AND SENTENCE OF DEATH AFFIRMED.

The complained-of statement, appellant's objection, and the trial court's ruling occurred near the beginning of the State's final closing argument: According to appellant, the prosecutor's argument that he was "hiding" was an impermissible reference to the fact that he did not testify at trial, thereby violating his privilege against self-incrimination.

Moreover, this is a case involving a black victim, a black defendant and a jury which was comprised of blacks, thereby diminishing Brewer's contention that the prosecutor purposely struck black jurors.11  See Mack v. State, 650 So.2d 1289, 1298 (Miss.1994). The court reversed our judgment and remanded the case for consideration of appellant's remaining claims of error.

App. We consider the ruling in light of what was before the trial court at the time the ruling was made and uphold the court's decision if it lies within the zone of reasonable disagreement.